Probably Fishing

Essays and notes by Fish. 14 pieces, organized by topic below.

Latest

Who Gets to Use Intelligence? · 12 min

You can download one of the best open-weight models in the world for free, and still be unable to run it. Open weights answer one question about access. Three others decide whether you actually get to use the thing.

Protocol Economics

Whether Algorand can pay for itself: fees, emissions, burns and validator incentives, and what the Foundation is spending the treasury on in the meantime.

  • If You Give A Mouse A Cookie · 4 min

    Uncapping ALGO is not the threat. Spending the treasury without growing the network is. Why node runners should withhold the upgrade vote until the Foundation concedes.

  • The Chicken and The ALGO · 5 min

    Not users-vs-builders but a supply-and-incentive mismatch: the Foundation is the largest seller, funding little that grows demand. Four ways to cap or hand off the treasury.

  • Misalignment of Spending · 4 min

    $72.5M of net outflows in Q1 2025, of which roughly 14% arguably helped the community. Plus the story of asking $2–3k/month to maintain Réti, and being told no.

  • Musings on the Pond II · 14 min

    A year on: outflows nearly halved and consensus rewards landed, but revenue is ~$730k/yr, xGov is still broken, and the RWA focus is costing us on-chain growth.

  • Musings on the Pond · 13 min

    Algorand is spending ~$350k/day against ~$5k/day in fees. A holistic proposal: node incentives, retroactive public goods funding, and an uncapped supply with a burn.

Governance Design

Why stake-weighted voting captures treasuries, and what to build instead: elected councils, median voting, retroactive funding.

  • Algorand Governance · 5 min

    Tying xGov voting power to blocks proposed hands the treasury to whales. The case for an elected council with median-based budget voting, and what the current proposal gets wrong.

  • Who Said Governance Was Simple? · 7 min

    xGov pays for promises, not delivery, and lets stake decide. Four fixes: an elected committee, retroactive-only funding, no stake-weighted votes, and median voting.

  • A concrete draft: 600M ALGO over ten years, allocated by a 115-member DAO scoring impact retroactively, with median voting and a 5% per-project cap.

  • The Ecosystem Activity Score · 2 min

    A weighted, normalized score for on-chain activity, usable for airdrops, voting power, and public goods funding. Asking for help on the variables and weights.

Theory & Politics

The wider case: who really pays when a price is set by decree, who controls access to intelligence, blockchains as institutional technology, and what gets lost when crypto trades its principles for a pump.

  • Who Gets to Use Intelligence? · 12 min

    You can download one of the best open-weight models in the world for free, and still be unable to run it. Open weights answer one question about access. Three others decide whether you actually get to use the thing.

  • New York City promises groceries 30% below private stores. Food retail earns about two cents on the dollar. The missing $30 does not come from profit, it comes from the taxpayer.

  • Reading Berg, Davidson and Potts alongside Coase: blockchain as institutional technology, manufacturing trust cheaply enough to flatten the firm.

  • On being left out of the US Crypto Strategic Reserve, and why chasing political favor for a pump betrays the thing that made crypto worth building.

Building

Notes from shipping things, and the case for tools over empires.

  • Built in two weeks and released permissionless. Why we gave away the airdrop protocol instead of gatekeeping it, and how NFD-duration gating makes sybil attacks expensive.